By Charles Pemu 
Former President Olusegun Obasanjo has expressed grave concern over the enduring nature of the Boko Haram insurgency, warning that the 15-year conflict has now significantly outlasted the Nigerian Civil War, which concluded after just 30 months.
Speaking virtually on Sunday during the Toyin Falola Interviews, which featured Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah and former Central Bank Deputy Governor, Dr. Kingsley Moghalu, the former President insisted that Nigeria’s persistent struggle with insurgency and banditry will continue unless the military implements a comprehensive strategy focusing on specialized foreign training, the strengthening of intelligence gathering, and the deployment of modern technology in its operations.
Obasanjo argued that Nigeria’s current security forces are fundamentally trained for “conventional warfare” suited for static enemies and planned engagements rather than the asymmetric, guerrilla-style conflicts they currently confront.
He outlined four essential requirements necessary to shift the strategic advantage:
- Specialised Training: The training must be specifically adapted for non-conventional conflicts where enemies are “fleeting targets or living among your people.” Obasanjo suggested Nigeria should look to countries that have dealt successfully with this type of warfare, stating there is “no shame” in inviting experts, potentially from nations like Colombia, to train Nigerian personnel.
- Equipment: The arms, ammunition, and gear required to fight guerrilla warfare are distinctly different from the equipment needed for conventional conflicts.
- Intelligence: The operation requires “absolute intelligence.” Obasanjo raised concerns about whether Nigeria’s security apparatus is trusted enough by external partners to facilitate the necessary intelligence sharing.
- Technology: The full integration of modern technology is crucial for effective counter-insurgency operations.
Obasanjo also criticized the structure of procurement, insisting that asking the military to be the sole buyer of equipment is wrong, as the entire security effort should be treated as an “industry.”
Recounting the Failed 2011 Dialogue
The former President recounted his personal, self-initiated visit to Maiduguri in 2011 shortly after the insurgency began. His aim was to understand Boko Haram’s origins and grievances; an effort he undertook without government support to avoid being perceived as a government agent.
He revealed that he found Boko Haram to be an organized group and was able to facilitate initial contact, urging them to agree to negotiations with the federal government. Although the insurgents initially insisted talks could not happen anywhere in Africa a condition Obasanjo rejected he ultimately reported his findings to the government. He recalled appealing to the insurgents to agree to a 21-day ceasefire while the government worked out the communication details. However, Obasanjo stated emphatically that the government never made contact with the group, allowing the initial attempt at dialogue to collapse.